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3. IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE FUTURE 
OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST 
James A. Russell 
1. Setting the Stage 
The United States entered 2006 confronting a confusing series of 
developments in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. On the one hand, 
the Bush Administration’s rhetorical embrace of expanding 
democracy in the region seemed to be bearing fruit. In Lebanon, 
internal demands for political change combined with international 
pressure helped force the withdrawal of Syria, potentially laying the 
groundwork for the re-emergence of democracy in that troubled 
country. One result of the situation in Lebanon, is that Syria is 
increasingly isolated internationally and under sustained and 
significant pressure from its neighbors to cooperate with the United 
Nations’ investigation of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Harriri. In Egypt, candidates associated with the outlawed 
Muslim Brotherhood won 88 seats in parliamentary elections, making 
the Islamist group the principal opposition group to Hosni Mubarak’s 
National Democratic Party. The Mubarak government also faces 
international pressure over the jailing of political opposition leader 
Ayman Noor (and other opposition figures) on what seem like 
obviously trumped up charges. On the West Bank, the Islamist 
terrorist organization Hamas seized the reigns of formal political 
power at the ballot box using time-honored campaign practices that 
played to disgruntled voters who were fed up with the cronyism, 
corruption and incompetence of Fatah. While this development is 
decried by many as an unmitigated disaster (including the Bush 
Administration), forcing the Islamist group into the political 
mainstream has and will continue to generate pressure from the 
surrounding states on Hamas to lay down its arms and renounce 
violence. 
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In Kuwait, political succession resulting from the death of the Emir 
was handled cooperatively with the ruling family abiding by the 
constitutional framework that called for the involvement and 
cooperation of the Kuwaiti parliament. In Saudi Arabia, municipal 
elections – albeit with no participation by women – occurred in the 
spring of 2005 for the first time in the Kingdom’s history. While these 
elections hardly represent a headlong rush into a grand democratic 
experiment, the fact that they happened at all indicates the possibility 
of new domestic political space opening up in the Kingdom. In Iraq, 
new Shiite political parties garnered most of the votes in Iraq’s 
December 2005 elections that boasted 70 percent voter participation, 
setting the stage for a critical period of political negotiations that may 
on the one hand see the creation of a national unity government that 
could help end the insurgency, or alternatively, see the country split 
off into more or less autonomous units. 
To be sure, not all these stirrings of political evolution are embraced 
by the Bush Administration and the foreign policy establishment, 
which had perhaps naively hoped that political reform and democracy 
would mean the embrace of secular as opposed to Islamist political 
ideologies. Looking at the issue of political evolution and reform in a 
more strategic context, however, suggests that a period of immutable 
political and generational transition is underway throughout the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf that over the long term holds forth the 
promise of more transparent and normative rules-based governance. 
This process of political transition now underway will not necessarily 
be smooth or nonviolent and will almost certainly involve Islamists 
being forced into assuming the responsibility of governance. But as 
regional politics inevitably transitions into to the “modern” era, the 
friction created by this process will manifest itself as a prolonged 
period of instability as the decrepit and discredited structures of the 
post-colonial era are replaced by something else. 
The hopeful signs of arguably healthy political change and evolution 
in the Middle East are, it must be admitted, overshadowed by the 
continued specter of regional violence and instability. The continued 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the “call and response” cycle 
of radicalizing violence between the antagonists show no sign of 
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abating. Israel’s unilateral moves toward establishing illegal borders 
and its drive to effectively fragment the West Bank into atomized 
cantonment areas only mean the underlying basis for the Palestinian 
grievance will go unaddressed. This means that the violence – and 
ripple effects around the region – will continue. Elsewhere, terrorist 
attacks in Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Kuwait, continued Shiite unrest in 
Bahrain and the ongoing battles of the Saudi regime against al-Qaida 
signal that many of the countries in the region face internal challenges 
to their rule and governance – just how serious remains to be seen. 
Also tearing at the region’s tattered fabric is the deadly violent spiral 
in Iraq, in which it has become increasingly difficult to tell who 
exactly is killing whom and for what reasons. Some believe that Iraq 
has already in fact become a “failed state”. In addition to insurgent 
attacks against the American occupying force, Iraqis are simply killing 
other Iraqis in ever greater numbers and in ways that could spiral out 
of control into a sectarian Algerian or Lebanese-style civil war. Such 
an outcome could have far-reaching negative consequences in the 
region with the prospect of a failed state fragmented in a variety of 
different ways that could in turn drive centrifugal forces in several of 
the surrounding states, such as Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and 
Bahrain. The fragmentation of Iraq would almost certainly invite 
additional outside military intervention by countries like Turkey and 
Iran, which would want to minimize the impact that a fractured Iraq 
might have on their borders and populations.   
Last, but not least, the three-way confrontation between the United 
States, Iran and Israel over Iran’s refusal to honor its commitments as 
a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signatory hangs like the sword of 
Damocles over the region. Iran reopened its uranium enrichment 
facility at Natanz on January 10, 2006, had the International Atomic 
Energy Agency remove seals and surveillance system on other nuclear 
facilities in mid-February, and apparently resumed uranium 
enrichment activities outside international oversight1. It is unclear 
whether there is any potential settlement that would stop what looks 
                                                 
1 Alissa Rubin, Rejecting Cooperation, Iran Asks IAEA to Remove Seals, Cameras, 
«Los Angeles Times», February 7, 2006, Internet Edition. 
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like Iran’s inexorable march to develop weapons-grade fissile 
material. Attempts to reach a political solution to the nuclear standoff 
are further complicated by: incendiary rhetoric from Iranian President 
Ahmadinejad calling for Israel to be wiped off the face of the earth; 
statements by various Israeli interlocutors that it will not allow Iran to 
become a nuclear weapons state; President Bush’s statements that the 
United States would defend Israel in the event of an Iranian attack; 
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s request in the spring of 
2006 for $75 million in funding to promote democracy in Iran. For 
added emphasis, Vice President Dick Cheney told the 2006 annual 
gathering of Israeli lobbyists that Iran would face “meaningful 
consequences” if it did not curb its nuclear program. Cheney stated 
further that «For our part, the United States is keeping all options on 
the table in addressing the irresponsible conduct of the regime»2. 
Iran’s response was delivered by Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s chief 
delegate to the IAEA, who stated that «…the United States is also 
susceptible to harm and pain. So if that is the path that the U.S. wishes 
to choose, let the ball roll»3. The implied use of force by the United 
States seems clear in these and other statements by senior Bush 
Administration officials. Within such a complicated political 
environment, it is frankly unclear whether strategic stability is 
operating at any level4. Escalation triggers and scenarios abound in the 
discombobulated and multidimensional coercive bargaining 
framework, and it is not hard to conceive of a wider regional war if 
the issue is not resolved through diplomacy.  
                                                 
2 Remarks as reported in Fred Barbash, Cheney: Iran Faces “Meaningful 
Consequences” if It Doesn’t Curb Nuclear Program, «Washington Post», March 7, 
2006, posted at 12:12 pm. 
3 George Jahn, Iran Threatens U.S. Over Nuclear Program, Associated Press, March 
9, 2006. 
4 Analysis offered in James A. Russell, Nuclear Strategy and the Modern Middle 
East, «Middle East Policy», vol. 11., no. 3, 2004, pp. 98-117, suggests that the lack 
of a functioning interstate communications system limits the extent to which any 
coercive bargaining framework can function with any predictability.  
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In sum, the region is both being driven apart and forced together at the 
same time, much like Benjamin Barber suggested over a decade ago in 
his seminal work Jihad vs. McWorld5. Barber posited that societies 
around the world were being buffeted by internal and external forces 
simultaneously, creating the kind of unstable internal environments 
that lead to the Balkans bursting apart at the seems in a catechism of 
violence in the 1990s. Barber presciently warned against the «a 
threatened Lebanonization of national states…» and «a retribalization 
of large swaths of human kind by war and bloodshed…». The 
centrifugal forces stretching the fabric of states is/was interacting with 
what Barber called “McWorld,” or globalization, in which societies 
are also being subjected to the forces of «one McWorld tied together 
by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce»6. Barber 
might today look at the Middle East as a laboratory for both forces.  
2. Out With Old, In With the New 
The discombobulated regional environment notwithstanding, it is 
difficult to say whether the neoconservative intellectual architects of 
the Bush Administration’s approach to the Persian Gulf and Middle 
East would find these events consistent with their vision of a 
reconfigured regional security environment featuring the spread of 
democracy and the creation of a new set of political actors that could 
lead the region into the modern era. Given some of the previously 
noted hopeful signs, neoconservatives of the Bush Administration 
might in fact look across the region and feel justified in their decision 
to reorient U.S. regional security strategy away from seeking a 
solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute and the buttressing of post World 
War II relationships with the Sunni-monarchies and political elites in 
the Levant and the Gulf. While it is too much to suggest that these 
twin pillars of U.S. strategy and policy have been abandoned, it is 
clear that these two issues no longer constitute the strategic 
                                                 
5 Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, «Atlantic Monthly», March 1992. 
6 Ibidem. 
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imperatives that drove U.S. strategy and policy throughout much of 
the post World War II era.  
The election of George Bush in 2001 and the ascendance of his 
neoconservative advisers saw the United States shift its regional 
policy emphasis to three principal pillars: unconditional and 
unequivocal support for Israel, support for the spread of democracy, 
and prosecution of the so-called “war on terror”. The Bush 
Administration has for all practical purposes given up trying to use 
U.S. power and influence to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute, giving 
Israel an effective blank check to unilaterally decide on its borders, the 
shape of Palestinian statehood, and what defines peaceful co-existence 
with the Palestinians. Just as important, both political parties in the 
United States embrace the Bush Administration’s approach. In the 
Gulf, the decision to use force to institute a Shiite lead government in 
Iraq has put the Sunni-lead monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula on 
notice that the terms and conditions of the old partnerships are in 
question. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia in 
particular has been subjected to widespread attacks across the U.S. 
political spectrum that create uncertainty surrounding the historic 
commitments made by successive administrations to Saudi territorial 
integrity and regime security. For its part, emerging domestic political 
forces in Saudi Arabia are in parallel pushing the Kingdom away from 
its one time security guarantor7. In short, uncertainty in the region 
reigns supreme, and U.S. strategy and policy are similarly in a state of 
flux, conflicted by the simultaneous commitments to promote 
democracy, fight terrorism, and ensure Israeli security.  
3. Framing the Future of U.S. Strategy and Policy 
This paper will argue that the future of U.S. relations with the Persian 
Gulf and Middle East will be influenced by a variety of different 
                                                 
7 James A. Russell, Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security Dilemma, 
«Middle East Policy», vol. 12, no. 3, 2005, pp. 64-78. 
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related and interactive factors. First and perhaps foremost is the 
ongoing search for paradigmatic and theoretical coherence in the 
foreign policy establishment towards the broader global environment 
that includes the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The United States and 
its foreign policy establishment are still searching for a coherent 
theoretical framework to describe the international system and the 
global security environment in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The ongoing debate over this theoretical framework is 
manifesting itself most immediately over various arguments being 
advanced about America’s role in the world and particularly in the 
Middle East – viewed by many as the most critical region in the world 
to U.S. interests and objectives. Related to the debate over global 
theoretical frameworks is a second tier debate over America’s role in 
the world and how to use its national instruments of power to achieve 
its objectives. Last but not least – and related to the first two debates – 
is a vitriolic and bitter exchange over Middle Eastern studies in the 
West writ large in which questions have been raised over the ability of 
traditional academic area experts and theoreticians to accurately 
describe the region. The lack of accurate, descriptive analysis, it is 
argued, has gradually infused its way into misguided policy and 
misguided policy execution.   
To make predictive statements over the course of the future anything 
other than pure speculation or educated guesswork, this paper loosely 
applies an overarching theoretical framework that draws upon the 
international relations theory known as constructivism. Constructivism 
asserts, among other things, the power of shared ideas and that people 
as agents of ideas matter, since their ideas become institutionalized in 
the form of identities, normative behavior and cultures8. The future of 
U.S. relations with the Middle East and Persian Gulf will be greatly 
influenced by people and their ideas and theories upon which those 
ideas are based. Using a constructivist framework and identifying 
particular epistemic communities that are competing for influence in 
the foreign policy process, it is possible to assert certain likely policy 
                                                 
8 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, MA, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000; Ted Hopf, The Promise of Constructivism in 
International Relations Theory, «International Security», vol. 23, no. 1, 1998, pp. 
171-200. 
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outcomes depending on which of these groups have established 
themselves in a position of political ascendancy in the U.S. foreign 
policy milieu.   
The interrelated theoretical debates being conducted at these 
respective levels all devolve down to a single point of delivery: policy 
execution and formulation. A related point of this paper is to highlight 
the wider policy impact of ideas and the cluster of epistemic 
communities that have coalesced around them. The ideas being 
debated by these communities at what might be thought of as the 
strategic (international systemic), operational (national level) and 
tactical (Middle East regional) levels will interact to determine the 
future of U.S. regional policy formulation and execution. This paper 
argues ultimately that the shape of U.S. policy will be determined by 
which epistemic community or combination of epistemic communities 
succeed in responding to the region’s structural insecurity defining 
U.S. regional interests and objectives and the corresponding 
configuration of U.S. national instruments of power and influence as 
they are applied in policy instruments that will have to respond to the 
region’s structural insecurity over the coming decades.  
4. The Gulf and Middle East Remain Ascendant – 
for the United States 
The ideas in these communities will inevitably collide with a reality in 
the Middle East shaped in large part from the region’s structural 
insecurity that promises to become steadily more serious9. The Middle 
East’s regional problems are not and will not be going away and will 
require some sort of sustained policy response by the United States. 
Stated another way, the United States will be unable to retreat from 
involvement in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Despite the 
Bush Administration’s retreat from identifying access to the region’s 
                                                 
9 A multi-layered look at the region’s structural insecurity is contained in James A. 
Russell (ed.), Critical Issues Facing the Middle East: Security, Politics and 
Economics, Palgrave MacMillan 2006. 
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oil as a predominant U.S. interest, it is hard to identify other issues as 
strategically important to the United States. Even in the unlikely event 
that the United States somehow successfully responds to President 
Bush’s call in his February 2006 State of the Union speech to «replace 
more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 
2025», global trends in oil production and consumption indicate that 
the health of the world’s economy will rise or fall depending on the 
ability of Persian Gulf producers to significantly expand oil 
production capacity over the next 20 years and beyond. The 
Department of Energy’s projections indicate that global demand for 
oil is likely to increase from approximately 80 million barrels per day 
to between 119-120 million barrels per by day 2025 – a 50 percent 
increase. The United States – currently consuming nearly 20 million 
barrels per day (25 percent of the world’s total) – is expected to be 
consuming 28 million barrels per day by 2025. Oil imports from the 
Gulf are expected to double over the period to over 4 million barrels 
per day, President Bush’s statements notwithstanding. Developing 
Asia will need increasing amounts of Gulf oil to fuel an economic 
expansion projected to grow at 5.5 percent annually – the highest 
growth rate in the world. The low cost of oil production in the Gulf 
coupled with comparatively low capital investment required to 
increase production relative to other producers mean that the region is 
well positioned to double oil production over the next 20 years to meet 
global demand10.  
However, a host of uncertainties could prevent the Gulf producers 
from meeting their part of the bargain in quenching the world’s 
insatiable thirst for oil. In a region beset by three major regional wars 
in the last quarter century (Iran-Iraq War, and Gulf Wars I and II), two 
ongoing occupations and insurgencies (West Bank and Iraq), a state 
seeking to acquire nuclear weapons (Iran), terrorist groups seeking to 
topple existing regimes and disrupt commerce through the Bab el 
Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz (to name only a few) there are a 
                                                 
10 Figures drawn from Energy Information Administration, International Energy 
Outlook 2005, Washington D.C., Department of Energy, July 2005, available online 
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/download.html. 
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host of variables that could prevent Gulf oil producers from meeting 
their production objectives. The February 2006 attack by suicide 
bombers on a Saudi oil facility sent tremors throughout global oil 
markets11. A series of successful attacks on Saudi export terminals or 
even in tanker traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz would result in 
more than just tremors. In addition to vulnerabilities to disruption by 
attack, internal factors also loom large and also present obstacles to 
increases in oil exports. 
Dramatic increases in the Gulf’s oil producing capacity will require 
substantial increases in investment, a significant quantity of which 
will have to come from foreign sources. The external and internal 
threat environments will affect the investment climate in the region. 
Without a stable investment climate, the Gulf oil producers may have 
difficulty in generating the investment needed to build sufficient 
capacity to meet global demand. Current investments of the Gulf 
producers in their infrastructure are already lagging. Recent figures 
released by the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicated that 
Middle East and North African producers will need to double their 
annual investment to $23 billion for exploration and infrastructure 
development to keep pace with global demand12. The IEA projects that 
regional producers will need to spend a total of $614 billion over the 
next decade to build sufficient capacity to keep the supply-demand 
balance in world oil markets. The consequences of not building this 
capacity are clear. The IEA’s chief economist, Fatih Birol, recently 
stated: «We may end up with much less oil from the Middle East than 
we demand. There is substantial risk of substantially higher oil prices 
if current investment in the Middle East is not stepped up 
substantially»13. Dramatically higher oil prices – estimated by some to 
                                                 
11 For more details, see Simon Henderson, Al Qaeda Attack on Abqaiq: The 
Vulnerability of Saudi Oil, Policy Watch no. 1082, Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, Washington D.C., February 28, 2006. 
12 Figures in International Energy Agency’s, World Energy Outlook, as reported by 
Jad Mouawad, Oil Producers are Urged to Invest in More Capacity, «New York 
Times», November 7, 2005.  
13 As quoted in Carola Hoyos, IEA Warns of 50% Oil Price Rise by 2030, «Financial 
Times», November 2, 2005. 
 84
reach $80 per barrel in the next decade – would slow economic 
growth around the world. The key country in this nexus is Saudi 
Arabia, now possessing nearly 25 percent of the world’s estimated 
reserves. Saudi Arabia plans to expand oil production capacity from 
10 million barrels per day to 12.5 million barrels by 2009, but there no 
plans to expand capacity in the Kingdom beyond 15 million barrels 
per day – far short of the IEA’s target of 18 million barrels per day by 
203014. 
As the principal “provider” in today’s global market place for 
security, the United States must seek to prevent any of these and other 
potential threats from disrupting the short and longer-term functioning 
of world oil markets. Recent calls to reduce U.S. dependence on 
imported oil miss the broader point: there is no other country in the 
world with larger stakes in bringing oil to market in predictable and 
steadily increasing quantities. According to the World Bank, the 
United States 2004 Gross Domestic Product of $11.6 trillion accounts 
for about 28 percent of the world’s estimated GDP of $40.8 trillion15. 
Any disruption in the global economy resulting from significant and 
sustained disruptions in oil supplies would hit disproportionately 
harder in the United States than in other countries. Moreover, 
significant disruptions in either the pricing and/or supply of oil that 
slows the projected growth in Asia will have global economic 
consequences that will also have serious negative consequences for 
the United States. In short, with the world’s largest economy, the U.S. 
can and must exercise its influence through policy tools to help ensure 
that Gulf and the Middle East remain stable and functioning regions in 
the wider international system16. 
It is not just the immutable laws of global economics, however, that 
will force the United States to remain focused on the Persian Gulf and 
                                                 
14 Figures from Jad Mouawad, op. cit. 
15 The World Bank, Quick Reference Tables at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf
16 Case spelled out in greater detail in Gawdat Bahgat, US Oil Outlook, «Middle 
East Economic Survey», vol. 49, no. 9, February 27, 2006. 
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the Middle East. The oft-cited fact that 15 out of the 19 hijackers on 
9/11 came from Saudi Arabia has formed part of a broader narrative 
suggesting that the tentacles of terrorism stretch deeply into the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf – the principal threat to U.S. national 
security. In his oft-cited November 2003 speech calling for democracy 
in the Middle East, President Bush stated that: 
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the 
lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – 
because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the 
expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place 
where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of 
stagnation, resentment and violence ready for export. And with 
the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to our 
country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the 
status quo17. 
The Bush Administration has effectively established a narrative that 
posits a connectivity (however flawed) between a variety of different 
and disparate elements – terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland and 
elsewhere, undemocratic and repressive regimes in the Middle East, 
poverty and a lack of human development, and instituting democracy 
in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. All these elements form part of a 
broader backdrop framing the case for continued involvement in the 
region. At a political level, this narrative provides the supporting 
framework both for the global war on terrorism and the Middle East 
democracy initiative. At the military level it provides the basis for the 
recent calls in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review to increase the 
numbers of U.S. special operations forces that can operate in 
counterinsurgency and post-conflict environments like that being 
encountered in Iraq. While it is true that successive American 
administrations may not sign up to elements of the narrative, it is also 
the case that future administrations will find it hard to significantly 
recast the story line in ways that would justify a significant U.S. 
retreat from regional affairs. 
                                                 
17 Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for 
Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington D.C., November 6, 
2003. 
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While the current U.S. involvement in the Middle East is framed in 
the context of the so-called war on terror, the region boasts a number 
of structural sources of insecurity that further promise to engulf the 
region in a sustained crisis that will require similarly sustained 
engagement from the United States and the international community.  
In today’s Middle East, threats to security stem from underlying 
structural problems that transcend the particular characteristics of 
certain states. The problems of authoritarian governments, Islamic 
extremism, structural unemployment, terrorism, drug trafficking, 
human trafficking, and organized crime are transnational problems 
and region-wide phenomena not confined to geographic units defined 
by states’ borders. 
Security in the Middle East must be viewed as a multidimensional 
construct that demands multi-level and interdisciplinary levels of 
analysis. Development of a different paradigm to consider 
differentiated elements of security also suggests a parallel effort to 
bring instruments of state power and its organizations into some kind 
of alignment with this new marketplace of security. In his book The 
Pentagon’s New Map, Tom Barnett suggests that for the United States 
the global environment represents a kind of new marketplace for 
security. According to Barnett, the United States needs to think of 
using force in the context of “exporting security” along the global 
fault lines separating those states participating in globalization and 
those that are not18. It seems clear, for example, that the United States 
now lies suspended in a state of paradigmatic, institutional, and 
intellectual disconnect as it seeks to apply its traditional instruments of 
state power that are wholly unsuited to today’s security environment 
in an approach inadequately described by the meaningless phrase 
“global war on terrorism”19. Fleshing out the sources of the disconnect 
is important not just for the United States but for the international 
community.  
                                                 
18 Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map, New York, Berkley Books, 2004. 
19 Thomas Johnson, James A. Russell, A Hard Day’s Night: The United States and 
the Global War on Terrorism, «Comparative Strategy», vol. 24, no. 2, 2005, pp. 
127-151.  
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5. The Region’s Structural Insecurity 
Today’s regional security environment in the Middle East and the 
Persian Gulf remains highly unstable, an instability that due to its 
intensity and duration suggests deep-rooted structural problems that 
go beyond the interstate disputes associated with the Arab-Israeli 
Wars and intra-regional rivalries that have also resulted in the Iran-
Iraq War and Gulf Wars I and II. Various forces identified below have 
been identified by the National Intelligence Council as the 
environment for the “perfect storm” that will almost certainly result in 
pervasive future instability20. The security environment is only a 
manifestation of the region’s deep systemic problems, including those 
that follow.  
Governments and Governance 
As documented by the three successive Arab Human Development 
Reports, the region faces a basic and overriding crisis in governance. 
The terms and conditions of citizenship and the development of basic 
elements of civic society are being addressed as the region navigates 
its way towards developing new societies21. Today, the region 
confronts the wreckage of the failed secular Arab nationalist 
movement, Arab socialism, and Pan-Arabism, as well as leftover 
anachronistic forms of governments essentially run as businesses by 
familial elites. The era of these governmental forms is drawing to a 
close, and it remains unclear what forms of governance will emerge to 
take their places. The process of transition to new governmental 
structures may be violent and result in region-wide instability, and the 
types of governments that emerge may be revolutionary in nature. 
While the post-colonial secular elites successfully repressed political 
Islam and the Islamists throughout much of the 20th century, Islamists 
                                                 
20 National Intelligence Council, Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National 
Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project, Washington D.C., December 2004. 
21 For example, issues of citizenship and the relationship between the governed and 
the government in Saudi Arabia are addressed by Gwen Okruhlik, The Irony of Islah 
(Reform), «Washington Quarterly», vol. 28, no. 4, 2005, pp. 153-170. 
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remain a powerful domestic political constituency in most Middle 
Eastern societies.  
The era of political Islam is arriving in the Middle East, a result of 
generational change and the inevitable, gradual collapse of the post-
colonial secular order in countries like Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq. 
It remains unclear whether Islamists across the Diaspora will adopt the 
intellectual and ideological radicalism articulated by Osama bin Laden 
and Ayman al-Zawahiri or some other more moderate frames22. Iran’s 
discredited model of Islamic governance presents another possibility.  
Other competitors for the space of governance are appearing in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, where Hamas has emerged as viable 
contender to the Palestinian authority’s attempt to introduce some 
semblance of democracy to the Palestinians. In the Gulf, various of 
the familial elites are attempting to forestall the development of 
Islamism by encouraging political reforms that create circumscribed 
forums for more widespread political participation23. In Iraq, it appears 
that the Shiites and the clerical order headed by Ayatollah Sistani will 
have a chance to test their hand at heading some form of federated 
governance that could provide yet another model for regional 
governments.   
While there is common intellectual and spiritual ground between the 
Islamists and bin Laden, it seems clear that there is not yet a broadly-
based social movement embracing bin Laden’s idea of a unification of 
the Ummah and a return to the days of the Caliphate. Characterized by 
some as the struggle for the soul of Islam, it is this struggle to develop 
a coherent political philosophy that can guide the development of 
different ways of governance that may be the single biggest 
determinant of stability and security. What makes the impending crisis 
of governance so important is the host of pressing problems that will 
                                                 
22 Described eloquently by Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2004.  
23 Joseph Kechichian, Democratization in the Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to 
the GCC, «Middle East Policy», vol. 11, no. 4, 2004. 
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challenge the ability of all governments to deliver competent 
“governance” for all the region’s populations.  
Urbanized, Youthful and Unemployed Populations 
Although projections depict slowing population growth, the region’s 
population is expected to more than double by 2050 to reach 649 
million individuals. Saudi Arabia and Yemen are expected to grow 
almost fourfold by 2050, from 24 million to 91 million, and from 19 
million to 71 million, respectively. Egypt and Iran are predicted to 
have populations of over 100 million in 2050. Only 25 percent of the 
population was urban in 1960, compared with 57 percent in 2001. 
This rate is expected to climb to 70 percent by 2015, with about one-
quarter of the population living in cities of one million or more. 
Regional populations are also increasingly youthful. A “youth 
explosion,” where ages 20-24 – the key age group entering the job 
market and political society – has grown steadily from 10 million in 
1950 to 36 million today, and will grow to at least 56 million by 2050, 
according to the United Nations. These youths are entering societies 
already shouldering profound structural unemployment, ranging 
between 20-30 percent in some Middle Eastern countries, which only 
promise to become worse as populations continue their inexorable 
increase.  
Water 
Fresh water shortages, already below World Bank minimums, will 
only grow more acute due to the lack of renewable freshwater sources 
as populations increase and present new challenges to governance. 
Increasing reliance on expensive desalinated water will help in the oil 
rich Gulf States, but is more of a problem for the non-oil rich 
countries such as Jordan. 
Economics  
Despite the region’s large oil reserves, economic growth rates 
generally lag behind much of the developing world. The lack of global 
competitiveness flows from a general lack of private sector 
development and non-diversified economies, which is manifested by 
high structural unemployment throughout the region. Perhaps the 
region’s most critical stumbling block in building competitive 
economies revolves around the human capital inefficiencies resulting 
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from the lack of women in the work force. Societies that deny women 
basic human rights are consequently denied access to the human 
capital that resides in roughly 50 percent of their populations.  
“Traditional” Sources of Insecurity 
Long-term sources of insecurity provide the tectonic plates of geologic 
strata over which the shorter-term sources of insecurity bubble and 
boil like hot magma in volcanic eruptions. As previously noted, short 
term sources of insecurity seem abundantly consistent with various 
theories of realism. Historic and enduring interstate rivalries and the 
quest of states for security still represent powerful and enduring 
sources of conflict. The quest for nuclear and other non conventional 
weapons by a variety of states must certainly appear at the top of any 
list of sources of insecurity.  
Structural long-term sources of instability will inexorably gather 
momentum over the next decade and beyond. Populations will 
increase and will be concentrated mainly in urban areas; fresh water 
will become scarcer; structural unemployment and slow economic 
growth are unlikely to go away; and aging transportation, housing and 
communications infrastructures will face increasing strain due to these 
underlying systemic forces. These long-term forces will collide with 
the enduring sources of inter- and intra-state conflict, promising to 
create a “perfect storm” of instability and conflict.  
6. Epistemic Communities and the Search for Theoretical 
and Intellectual Coherence 
If the aforementioned descriptions paint a confusing regional mosaic 
that seems to defy a system-wide theoretical explanation, the inability 
to cast the Persian Gulf and Middle East into a coherent theoretical 
framework is part of the broader paradigmatic uncertainty swirling in 
academic and policy communities about how to properly describe the 
international environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. 
Lacking a coherent description has in turn made it more difficult to 
offer up well articulated and mutually supporting policy objectives. 
Labels, names, and descriptive terminology matter since they flow 
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from epistemological foundations that inform the intellectual and 
theoretical constructs providing a basis for policy formulation. 
President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haas, perhaps 
stated it best when he recently argued that «Here we are, more than 16 
years after the Berlin Wall began to crumble, and this period still lacks 
a name. Calling it the post-Cold War era is an admission that we know 
what came before but not where we are, much less where we are 
heading»24. The sense of unpredictability and the resulting anxiety 
referenced in Haas’s comments reflect a deeper uncertainty over the 
nature of the international system. The Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf represent sources of particularly intense public anxiety in the 
United States and much of the developed world. In March 2006, two 
opinion polls indicated that almost half of Americans have a negative 
perception of Islam and one in four of those surveyed professed 
“extreme” anti-Muslim views25. The polls followed rioting in the 
Middle East and Central Asia over the appearance of cartoons 
published by a Danish newspaper represented only the latest in a 
series of incidents demonstrating the unease in the relationships 
between religious and geographic blocs around the world.    
The quest for theoretical coherence is important in another context, 
since it is theories and the ideas upon which those theories are based 
that can infuse the belief systems of those responsible for framing 
policy and policy execution26. A central assertion of this paper is that 
the future of U.S. relations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf will be 
increasingly driven by the outcomes of theoretical debates between a 
                                                 
24 Richard Haass, This Isn’t Called the [Blank] Era for Nothing, «Washington Post», 
January 8, 2006, p. B04. 
25 PR Newswire, Two New Polls Show Negative Image of Islam in U.S., March 9, 
2006. A survey by the Council on American-Islamic Relations showed that one 
quarter of Americans embrace stereotypes of Muslims as valuing life less than other 
people and that Islam teaches violence and hatred. An ABC News Washington Post 
poll indicated that 46 percent of Americans have a negative perception of Islam. 
26 An analytical framework suggesting such a causal link is detailed in Judith 
Goldstein, Robert Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions 
and Political Change, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press. 
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variety of particular and identifiable epistemic communities. As defined 
by political scientist Anne Clunan, an epistemic community is: 
…a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
authoritative claims to policy-relevant knowledge and in a 
particular issue area. These professionals may have different 
disciplinary and professional backgrounds and may be located in 
different countries, but they share a set of norms that motivate 
their common action, a set of causal beliefs about central 
problems in their area of expertise, shared criteria for evaluating 
knowledge and a common policy enterprise…27  
As also emphasized by Clunan, epistemic communities serve as 
critical and influential information providers to policy decision 
makers: «Epistemic communities exercise influence by interpreting… 
complex problems and possible responses for decision makers within 
national governments and international organizations. Their influence 
comes in part from their claim to authoritative and consensual 
knowledge based on their professional expertise»28. Consistent with 
Clunan’s formulation, this paper asserts that epistemic communities 
will exercise tremendous impact on the conduct of future U.S. 
relations with the Middle East. Supporting this general line of 
argument, strategist Colin Gray opined in 2004: «There is something 
to be said for the proposition that, or hope that, the circumstance 
brings forth the person. But, still I believe that individuals and their 
relationships can make history. Studies such as this, which tend to be 
long on strategic ideas and geopolitical concepts, are apt to fail to 
accord people the significance that they deserve»29. Arguments 
asserting the importance of people, ideas and identity fly in the face of 
                                                 
27 Anne Clunan, Epistemic Community in M. Bevir (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Governance, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage Publications, 2006. Also see Anne Clunan, 
Constructing Concepts of Identity, in R. Sil, E.M. Doherty (eds.), Beyond 
Boundaries: Disciplines, Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International 
Studies, Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2000, pp. 87-116. 
28 Ibidem. 
29 Colin Gray, The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order, Lexington, 
KY, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, p. 37. 
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mainstream international relations realist theory, which argues that 
interests and corresponding rational choice by individuals ultimately 
drive the actions of states in the world’s anarchic self-help system. 
Consistent with Clunan’s descriptive framework, an argument can be 
made that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 can be directly 
linked to the influence and ideas of a particular epistemic community 
known as “neoconservatives.” The neoconservative epistemic 
community effectively operationalized its ideas in policy resulting in 
the Iraq invasion and occupation. The ideas and beliefs of the 
neoconservatives sprang from a particular epistemology that informed 
a world view, beliefs about the role of the United States in the world, 
and, just as important, a particular view of the Middle East. The 
resulting intellectual framework lead to a policy in the Middle East 
which held that U.S. interests were best served by invading Iraq and 
abandoning the Middle East peace process. Upon becoming married 
with political power and authority, these views were operationalized 
in policy to devastating effect. The actions of the neoconservatives are 
if anything a textbook example of the impact that epistemic 
communities can have on U.S. policy execution in the Gulf and 
Middle East.   
The neoconservative’s achievement of political power and influence 
in the Bush II Administration came at the expense of the realist-
oriented group of advisers that had shaped the Bush I approach to the 
Middle East in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Without political 
power, their views would have remained confined to the sound-byte 
talking head space populated by Washington think-tanks and cable 
news networks. The neoconservatives, of course, sprouted from a 
lively and healthy well-spring of epistemic communities competing 
for power and influence in the formulation and execution of foreign 
policy. U.S. administrations regardless of their political stripe have 
drawn extensively upon various realist- and liberal- oriented epistemic 
communities in shaping their policy approaches to the world and the 
Middle East. The intellectual disciples of the realist and liberal policy 
schools remain vibrant epistemic communities, and will continue to 
furnish people into the foreign policy bureaucracy. As demonstrated 
by the Bush Administration, however, these mainstream realist and 
liberal communities can be bypassed or outmaneuvered by other 
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groups in competition for access and policy influence. Groups that 
today might seem out of the mainstream relative to the realist and 
liberal mainstream could one day assume positions of power and 
authority and operationalize their own views in foreign policy as it 
relates to the Middle East and Persian Gulf.   
7. Newest of the Epistemic Groups: “The Globalizers” 
For illustrative purposes, it is useful to review a few of the competing 
schools of thought that have emerged that attempt to provide an over-
arching set of ideas to place the international system into a meaningful 
context. Perhaps the newest of these ideas is defined as 
“globalization,” which refers to the increasing interconnectivity of the 
international system that features growing global flows of goods, 
money, data and people. Some scholars argue that globalization is 
fundamentally altering the international system, leading to decline in 
the Westphalian system of state-based governance.  
Those arguing this point of view believe that states are increasingly 
unable to regulate growing global flows and that the international 
system is in the process of devolving into something described as 
“neomedievalism” in which territorial boundaries become more fluid 
and dynamic30. One proponent of this school of thought, Philip Cerny, 
argues that «…neomedievalism means we are increasingly in the 
presence of a plurality of overlapping, competing, and intersecting 
power structures – institutions, political processes, economic 
developments, and social transformations – above, below and cutting 
across states and states system. States today represent only one level 
of this power structure, becoming more diffuse, internally split, and 
enmeshed in wider complex webs of power»31. Cerny and others 
believe that the evolving international environment has created a new 
                                                 
30 For a interesting discussion of the changing nature of borders and territoriality see 
Peter Andreas, Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty First 
Century, «International Security», vol. 28, no. 2, 2003, pp. 78-111. 
31 Philip Cerny, Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma, «Naval War College 
Review», vol. 58, no. 1, 2005, p. 12. 
 95
and complex security dilemma for states, which are facing challenges 
to their authority from a variety of different forces unleashed by 
globalization32. 
A variation on this theme suggests that a systems theoretical 
perspective can provide another way to think about the decline in the 
primacy of state actors in the international environment33. This 
argument posits that “sub-system dynamics,” or forces not associated 
with or controlled by nation states are driving the dynamics of the 
international environment34. Under this theoretical perspective, the 
international system is seen as the “super system,” the nation state as 
the “system,” and forces below the nation state as “subsystem”. These 
subsystem forces include such things as ethnocentrism, religion, 
tribalism, sectarianism, resource scarcity and environmental factors, 
and population growth, to mention a few. For example, it could be 
argued that Samuel Huntington’s case for future drivers of global 
conflict as enunciated in his seminal work Clash of Civilizations35 is 
rooted in an argument positing the primacy of subsystem dynamics – 
or forces not associated with nation states. Virulent Islamic extremist 
ideology that forms the basis of the al-Qaida narrative is one example 
of a powerful subsystem dynamic. 
To the globalizers and system theorists, there is no better indicator to 
buttress their claims over the decline of the nation state than the 
growing numbers of states that are either failing or in danger of 
failing. Approximately two billion people, or about 30 percent of the 
world’s population was recently estimated to be living in insecure 
environments36. An index of failed or failing states compiled by 
                                                 
32 Ibidem p. 13. 
33 Background on systems theory can be found in Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General 
Systems Theory, London, Allen Lane, 1968.  
34 Thomas H. Johnson, James A. Russell, op. cit. 
35 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, «Foreign Affairs», vol. 72, no. 
3, 1993, pp. 28-50. 
36 The Failed States Index, «Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace», July/August 
2005, available online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id= 
3098. 
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«Foreign Policy» indicates that nearly 60 states are in danger of 
failing – just under a third of the world’s total37. The state rankings 
were based on 12 weighted indicators that measured such factors as 
demographic pressures, prevalence of refugees and displaced persons, 
presence of group grievances, urban development, economic decline, 
delegitimization of the state and human rights conditions. The Middle 
East contains a number of these troublesome cases.  
Table 1 
Failing States in the Middle East and Persian Gulf38
Critical In Danger Borderline 
Iraq Egypt Iran 
Yemen Lebanon Saudi Arabia 
 Syria Turkey 
 
8. Rise and Fall of the Realists 
It has to be admitted that the theories advanced by the globalizers and 
the system theorists for the most part remain outside the policy 
mainstream in the American national security and foreign policy 
establishment. The epistemic communities surrounding these ideas 
have not achieved political power, at least in the field of national 
security affairs. While the ideas of those offering up the model of 
globalization have been embraced in the field of economics, the 
realists and their essential belief in the primacy of states as arbiters of 
security in the anarchic international system remain ascendant.  
The “realist” epistemic community came largely out of East Coast ivy-
league schools (and the University of Chicago) in which Hans 
Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and others educated a variety of their 
disciples that later exercised profound influence on U.S. foreign policy. 




After World War II, George Kennan and his doctrine of containment 
cemented the realist’s grip on national security strategy. Kennan 
believed that the Soviet Union would eventually collapse as a result of 
its own internal contradictions and built doctrine to achieve that 
objective, which featured alliances and security partnerships built on the 
assumption of collective defense, forward deployed U.S. forces along 
the periphery of the Soviet Union and, occasionally, the use of force in 
those situations warranted in the context of the struggle. Henry 
Kissinger and his protégés (including Brent Scowcroft) followed behind 
Kennan and worked hard to provide a framework during the 1970s that 
sought to manage the Soviet relationship with dialogue and arms 
control agreements without fundamentally disagreeing with Kennan’s 
approach. During the Cold War, realists saw the Middle East as another 
of the contested spaces on the periphery of the Soviet Union, which 
lead to the unsuccessful attempts to create a regional collective security 
framework to combat and deter Soviet expansion.  
While there are nuanced and important variations in the realist school, 
there is basic agreement over several unifying themes: 1) states remain 
the most important arbiter of international security and stability; 2) the 
international system remains a “self help” system in which states are 
driven to take whatever steps they think necessary to protect 
themselves and further their power and influence; 3) the idea of a 
balance of power is an important feature as states pursue relationships 
and alliances to maintain stability; 4) international institutions are 
useful as instruments to help states pursue their objectives, but not as 
instruments that can guarantee and preserve peace and security; 5) 
using these precepts, policy making under the realist framework 
features decision-makers using rational choice to decide on steps to 
protect and further the state’s interests based on a calculation of the 
costs and benefits from particular courses of action; 6) force should be 
used only in those circumstances when national interests are 
sufficiently threatened to justify the costs; 7) realists in general have a 
dim view of human nature and believe that man is driven by self 
interest39.  
                                                 
39 Summary of realist views drawn from John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great 
Power Politics, Chicago, ILL, Chicago University Press, 1991, pp. 1-18; Charles 
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Within the realist school, however, there are important divisions of 
opinion over the implication of the United States’ position of 
statistical supremacy in relation to its major rivals and how best to 
marshal that supremacy in ways that can increase U.S. power and 
influence relative to other actors40. Some point to U.S. military 
expenditures – now nearly half of all defense spending world wide 
and more than 20 times the spending of its nearest rivals as providing 
the U.S. with the ability to realize a global hegemony and essentially 
take on the role as the new “sheriff” in the international system41. But 
others reject this point, noting that the United States in fact lacks the 
resources and means to operationalize a kind of unilateral hegemony42. 
Instead, the argument goes, the United States should utilize its “soft 
power” assets to build alliances and political relationships in ways that 
will allow it to achieve its objectives without an over-reliance on force 
or a coercive framework based on the threat of military action43. 
9. Liberalism and the Clinton Era 
Interestingly, the Clinton Administration in some respects provided 
the theoretical bridge between the realist approach of the Bush I 
administration and the neoconservative revolution in Bush II. 
Reflecting the principal strands of “liberalism” in American foreign 
policy, the Clinton Administration based its world view on a number 
of assumptions: 1) prosperous nations operating in an open and 
                                                                                                                   
Kegley Jr., Eugene Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and Transformation, 9th Ed., 
Belmont, CA, Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2004, pp. 35-42. 
40 Different aspects of the arguments surrounding this issue can be found in G. John 
Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Ithaca, 
NY, Cornell University Press, 2002. 
41 Colin Gray, op. cit. 
42 Mearsheimer rejects this argument, stating that it «…virtually impossible for any 
state to achieve global hegemony», John Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 41. 
43 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics, Cambridge, MA, 
Perseus Books 2004. 
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economically interdependent system are less likely to use force to 
settle disputes; 2) democracies are less likely to fight each other; 3) 
international institutions serve a useful purpose by helping states 
avoid war by building collective security based on cooperative 
relationships; 4) morality can and should play a role in foreign policy 
execution44. Consistent with the liberal view, the Clinton 
Administration sought to create conditions to spur what it saw as an 
ineluctable expansion of the normative, rules-based governance that 
would inevitably make the world a safer, more harmonious 
environment less prone to violence45. Also underpinning this 
worldview was an essential optimism about human nature, informed 
by rationality, ethics, and morality. The Clinton Administration 
assembled a group from the “liberal” epistemic community that drew 
upon these assumptions – Anthony Lake, Sandy Berger, Madeleine 
Albright, Strobe Talbott and William Perry – that exercised 
tremendous influence on foreign policy for nearly a decade.  
In the Middle East, the Clinton Administration adopted the strategy of 
dual containment, in which it sought to simultaneously “contain” Iran 
and Iraq while focusing its efforts on trying to serve as broker in 
solving the Arab-Israeli dispute. It rejected what it saw as unwarranted 
pressure on the Israelis by the Bush I administration and brought into 
policy-making positions a number of high profile officials out of the 
Israeli lobby in Washington D.C., who counseled a less direct U.S. 
role in the peace process. On a broader level, the Clinton 
Administration, however, believed that solving the Arab-Israeli 
dispute represented the cornerstone of regional stability and that 
resolving this problem would then allow it to address the pressing 
problems of Iraq’s recalcitrance and Iran’s objectionable behaviors46. 
                                                 
44 As summarized by John Mearsheimer, op.cit., p. 9 and Charles Kegley Jr., Eugene 
Wittkopf, op.cit., p 34. 
45 Best expressed in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, New 
York, Avon, 1992. 
46 The Clinton Administration’s approach known as dual containment was explained 
by then Clinton adviser Martin Indyk in «The Clinton Administration’s Approach to 
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The decade saw Middle East envoys like Dennis Ross tirelessly work 
on the ultimately unsuccessful effort to reach a solution to the Arab-
Israeli dispute resulting in the failed Camp David II meetings, which 
was followed by the second Intifada in September 2000. Meanwhile, 
at the UN, the United States and officials such as UN Acting 
Ambassador Peter Burleigh and State Department Assistant Secretary 
David Welch worked equally tirelessly in the Security Council to 
preserve consensus on the necessity to enforce the sanctions regime 
against the recalcitrant Saddam. During the decade as part of this 
approach, the Gulf States were integrated into the U.S. security 
umbrella and provided the U.S. with the access to the facilities that 
allowed the U.S. military to enforce the no-fly zones and the trade 
embargo against Iraq.  
In an echo of what was to come later, the Clinton Administration got 
maneuvered by the neoconservatives into endorsing the Iraq 
Liberation Act, which called for the United States to formally embrace 
the idea of regime change in Baghdad. The only practical impact of 
the legislation was to enrich neoconservative darling Ahmad Chalabi 
and his cronies living in London’s expensive West End. 
10. Liberals “Mugged by Reality” 
The neoconservatives of the Bush II administration selectively took 
certain aspects of the liberal worldview of the Clinton Administration 
but married them with a much darker world view framed by the 9/11 
attacks and rooted in their Cold War theology. That theology rejected 
the realists’ “management” of Soviet relations during the Cold War, 
arguing that the ideologically driven Soviets remained bent on the 
destruction of the West and would use any means to achieve its 
ultimate objective. Such an adversary, it was argued, was inherently 
“evil” and could only be countered by military strength across the 
                                                                                                                   
the Middle East», Speech to the Soref Symposium, Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy, May 18, 1993. 
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entire spectrum of conventional and nuclear capabilities. The 
neoconservative epistemic community sprouted out of a group of 
largely Jewish intellectuals that attended the City College of New 
York in the 1960s and created the neoconservative journal «The 
Public Interest». That core group of Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer and 
Daniel Bell, provided the intellectual foundations for a group that 
would later include Richard Perle, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Doug Feith, 
Frank Gaffney, Keith Payne, Elliott Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz, William 
Kristol and Robert Kagan – to name a few.  
Neoconservative theology integrated a number of common themes: 1) 
a belief that democracy and the framework of the internal governance 
of states should be an overriding consideration in the formulation of 
U.S. foreign policy; 2) skepticism over the ability of international 
institutions and multilateral treaties to manage the international 
environment; 3) a belief that American hegemonic power should be 
applied using force if necessary for moral purposes like the spread of 
democracy; 4) new adversaries like al-Qaida and Islamic extremists 
seeking mass destructive capabilities necessitated a new and more 
muscular foreign policy to reinvigorate America’s credibility that had 
been largely frittered away by the Clinton Administration; 5) no 
negotiation was possible with the new actors not subject to deterrence, 
auguring in a age of unrestricted warfare; 6) last, and by no means 
least, all the group passionately supported Israel and embraced the 
Likud party’s vision of a “greater Israel” encompassing most if not all 
of the occupied territories47. As applied to the Middle East, Richard 
                                                 
47 Views distilled from “Rebuilding American Defenses: Strategy, Forces and 
Resources for a New Century”, Project for a New American Century, Washington, 
DC, September 2000, accessed online at http://www.newamericancentury.org. Also 
drawn from Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, «New York Times 
Magazine», February 19, 2006. Other details of the group’s genealogy, that later 
drew in Condoleezza Rice is contained in James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The 
History of Bush’s War Cabinet, New York, Viking, 2004. Role of these advisers in 
crafting the Bush Administration’s approach in the Middle East is detailed in W. 
Patrick Lang, Drinking the Kool Aid, «Middle East Policy», vol. 11, no. 4, 2004. 
Also see Joshua M. Marshall, Practice to Deceive, «Washington Monthly», April 
2003, available online at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0304. 
marshall.html. 
 102
Perle drew upon several of these strands of argument when he stated 
in 2002: 
Hard-liners [neoconservatives] are not bent on imposing 
democracy on anybody. But it is realistic to notice the connection 
between Middle Eastern tyranny and Middle Eastern terrorism; 
and it is realistic too to understand that it is sometimes true that 
societies that yearn for freedom are denied it by force – as Iraq 
was by Saddam’s force. The U.S. may not be able to lead 
countries through the door to democracy; but where that door is 
locked shut by a totalitarian deadbolt, American power may be 
the only way to open it up.48
During the 1980s, the neoconservatives assumed positions of power in 
the Reagan Administration and were instrumental in President 
Reagan’s casting of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” during the 
1980 presidential campaign. The group, including Richard Perle, 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Paul Wolfowitz, advocated an aggressive 
strategy called “rollback” that sought not just to contain the spread of 
Soviet power but to aggressively try to shrink those areas under Soviet 
influence around the world. To justify their aggressive approach, the 
group engineered the “B Team” exercise at the beginning of the 
Reagan Administration. In what would prove to be a precursor some 
23-years later, the group came into office convinced that intelligence 
estimates of the Soviet threat were vastly understated. The B team 
looked at the existing assessments and concluded that the CIA was 
wrong and that the Soviets were on the verge of achieving their aim of 
global domination. President Reagan’s label of the “Evil Empire” 
would again be eerily repeated by President Bush’s references to good 
vs. evil metaphors following the 9/11 attacks49. Reagan’s advisers 
came to view all regional instability through the lens of the expansion 
of the Soviet evil empire that needed to be countered through rollback. 
                                                 
48 David Frum and Richard Perle, Beware the Soft-Line Ideologues, «Wall Street 
Journal», January 7, 2004, p. 12.  
49 A cogent re-retelling of the “B Team” exercise and the role today’s 
neoconservatives is contained in Leila Hudson, The New Ivory Towers: Think Tanks, 
Strategic Studies and “Counterrealism”, «Middle East Policy», vol. 12, no. 4, 2005.  
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Various members of this group shared a number of other important 
characteristics. Many of them had worked for Senator Henry “Scoop” 
Jackson; were anti-arms control; strongly pro-Israel; favored building 
missile defense systems and favored the spread of democracy as 
central U.S. policy objective. A critical difference with the realists 
also was an essentially optimistic view of human nature, in which they 
believed that people had an innate desire for “freedom.” They also 
believed that idealism and morality should play an important if not 
defining role in the conduct of foreign policy. 
Various members of the group (Perle and Wolfowitz and Zalmay 
Khalilzad) studied under Albert Wohlstetter at the University of 
Chicago. During the 1960s Wohlstetter argued against the stability of 
mutually assured destruction on the basis that a surprise attack by an 
inherently untrustworthy and nefarious adversary might be impossible 
to respond to, particularly in view of the (at that time) inadequate 
preparation for a second strike capability50. Wohlstetter argued that 
«Where the published writings have not simply underestimated Soviet 
capabilities and the advantage of a first strike, they have in general 
placed artificial constraints on the Soviet use of the capabilities 
attributed to them»51. In powerful metaphors that would be all but 
repeated in the Bush II National Security Strategy report, Wohlstetter 
argued that « …we must expect a vast increase in the weight of attack 
which the Soviets can deliver with little warning, and the growth of 
significant Russian capability for an essentially warningless attack. As 
a result, strategic deterrence, while feasible, will be extremely difficult 
to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 1960s we may not have the 
power to deter attack»52. Wohlstetter’s dark views over the impending 
collapse of deterrence and the possible descent into an age of 
unrestricted warfare underpinned neoconservative formulations on the 
                                                 
50 Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror, P 1472, Rand Corporation, 
1958, available online at http://www.rand.org/publications/classics/wohlstetter/P1472/ 
P1472.html. 
51 Ibidem, p. 3. 
52 Ibidem, p. 7. 
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eve of the Iraq invasion. Prior to the Iraq invasion in March 2003, 
various high-level Bush Administrations officials pointed to U.S. 
vulnerabilities to surprise attack by a nuclear adversary that, this time, 
came in the form of a supposedly undeterrable Saddam Hussein. 
11. The Realist – Neoconservative – Liberal “Clash”  
Over Middle East Policy 
The clash between the realist-neoconservative-liberal epistemic 
communities is still being thrashed out in the Middle East over the 
issue of democracy promotion and the war on terrorism versus the 
requirements for regional security and stability. The Bush 
Administration’s active promotion of democracy around the world and 
in the Middle East in particular represents the tip of an intellectual 
iceberg, with the ideas supporting that tip greatly expanding below the 
surface. The battle lines between the neoconservative and realist 
epistemic communities have and are being played in the policy circles, 
the op-ed pages and talking head spaces in Washington D.C. and in 
associated academic communities. Interestingly, the liberals of the 
Clinton era have largely retreated from the public debate. In an ironic 
twist, the two schools of thought pit the current President Bush and his 
advisers against President George H.W. Bush and his advisers, most 
notably his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. Persistent 
disagreements and personality conflicts between officials from these 
two communities undermined the planning for the 2003 Iraq invasion 
and post-war planning to disastrous consequences53. The battle lines in 
Bush II pitted the Office of the Vice President (Cheney, Scooter Libby 
and David Addinton), the National Security Council (Condoleezza 
Rice and Elliot Abrams) and the Defense Department (Donald 
Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith) against the Bush I 
officials in the State Department (Colin Powell and Richard 
Armitage). 
                                                 
53 As detailed in James Fallows, Blind Into Baghdad, «Atlantic Monthly», 
January/February 2004. 
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Disagreements over the Iraq invasion had their roots in long-running 
disputes between these groups dating to the 1980s. The classical 
“realist” school of Bush I and his National Security Adviser Brent 
Scowcroft reflected central tenets of realism. Like “classic” realists, 
they believed that moralism and idealism were important but not 
driving forces in the conduct of foreign policy. In their world view 
force should only be used in those situations where U.S. national 
interests were directly threatened. In the Middle East, the Bush I 
administration appeared comfortable with the traditional relationships 
with the Sunni monarchies and saw no reason to address the issue of 
internal political reforms54. Consistent with this worldview, Bush I 
marshaled the international coalition in the fall of 2001 because of his 
perception consistent with previous Administrations – that the United 
States had to respond to the threat posed to the Arabian Peninsula by 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. While the operation was cloaked in an 
argument about Kuwaiti sovereignty, the United States intervened 
militarily because it did not want Saddam potentially exercising direct 
or indirect control over 40 percent of the world’s oil reserves. 
Consistent with classic realist thought, Bush I made good use of the 
international institutional framework to further U.S. objectives, which 
had the critical impact of legitimizing the use of force to expel 
Saddam55. Once evicted by the coalition, the United States allowed 
Saddam to withdraw and watched on the sidelines as Saddam then 
brutally put down the Shiite uprising in southern Iraq. The 
neoconservatives viewed the Bush Administration’s actions after Gulf 
War I as an indefensible betrayal of the Shiite rebels that had been 
tacitly encouraged into open revolt. The sordid end to Gulf War I in 
combination with the pressure brought by the Bush I Administration 
on the Israelis by the withholding of housing loan guarantees lead the 
neoconservatives to abandon Bush I during his re-election loss against 
William Clinton in 1992.   
                                                 
54 The thinking of Brent Scowcroft and the wider realist framework of Bush I is 
interestingly addressed in Jeffrey Goldberg, Breaking Ranks, «The New Yorker», 
vol. 81, no. 33, October 31, 2005. 
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12. Neoconservatism, Orientalism, and Middle Eastern 
Studies 
As the neoconservatives aligned themselves around the Bush II 
candidacy in 2000, another element combined to help create all the 
elements necessary for the “perfect storm” in the epistemic 
communities vying for influence in U.S. policy in the Middle East. Just 
as the Team B exercise had served as a useful platform to discredit 
intelligence community assessments of the Soviet Union 20 years 
earlier, the 9/11 attacks created a firestorm within Middle Eastern 
studies that helped provide another of the supporting elements of the 
narrative successfully crafted by the neoconservative before Gulf War 
II. In some respects, the public battle within Middle Eastern studies 
mirrored the parallel intra-bureaucratic turf battles during the 1990s in 
which the supposed “Arabists” within the State Department’s Near East 
Asia bureau became supplanted by the Clinton Administration’s “peace 
process” group drawn from the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, a creation of the Israeli lobby56. In the public sphere, the 1990s 
saw academic and area studies experts slowly but surely crowded out of 
the media-driven policy debate by Washington-based think tanks like 
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, The Saban Center at 
Brookings (created in 2002), the American Enterprise Institute, Project 
for a New American Century, the Jewish Institute for National Security 
Affairs, the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Security Policy, the 
Foreign Policy Research Institute and other groups that all strongly 
supported Israeli interests57.  
The 9/11 attacks provided the opportunity for the gloves to come off the 
simmering debate within the Middle Eastern studies community, a 
debate that provided the neoconservatives with important supporting 
                                                                                                                   
55 I am indebted to Anne Clunan for “connecting the dots” in placing the Bush I 
Presidency and Gulf War I in a classical realist framework.  
56 Lineage of the “Arabists” is detailed in Robert Kaplan, The Arabists: The 
Romance of an American Elite, New York, The Free Press, 1993. 
57 More details in Leila Hudson, op. cit. 
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intellectual ammunition in building a bridge from their general world 
view to Middle East policy. In the introduction of his searing indictment 
of the Middle Eastern studies academic community, Martin Kramer 
wrote in Ivory Towers on Sand: «It is no exaggeration to say that 
America’s academics have failed to predict or explain the major 
evolutions of Middle Eastern politics and society over the past two 
decades. Time and again, academics have been taken by surprise by 
their subjects; time and again, their paradigms have been swept away by 
events. Repeated failures have depleted the credibility of scholarship 
among influential publics»58. Kramer further accused the academic 
group known as the Middle East Studies Association of anti-Israeli bias, 
shoddy and irrelevant scholarship and as having a disconnected, 
romanticized view of the social, political and economic structures in the 
Arab Middle East. These scholars, Kramer argued, constituted nothing 
more than apologists for Arab radicals who were blinded by their own 
ill-informed analysis and ideological predispositions. 
Kramer’s accusations reignited the simmering bitterness over Edward 
Said’s accusations against the “orientalist” school of Middle East 
studies made to great effect in 197859. Said argued that Western views 
of the Arabs and the Middle East were themselves held captive to the 
romantic views of the region based largely on outdated study of 
Ottoman history developed at Oxford and Cambridge Universities and 
practiced by such scholars as Bernard Lewis. Said believed that 
certain “dogmas” pervaded the orientalist study of the region.  
…one is the absolute and systematic difference between the 
West, which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the 
Orient, which is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. Another dogma 
is that abstractions about the Orient, particularly those based on 
texts representing a “classical” Oriental civilization, are always 
preferable to direct evidence drawn from modern Oriental 
realities. A third dogma is that the Orient is eternal, uniform, and 
                                                 
58 Martin Kramer, Ivory Towers on Sand, Washington D.C., Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 2001. 
59 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York, Vintage, 1978. 
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incapable of defining itself; therefore it is assumed that a highly 
generalized and systematic vocabulary for describing the Orient 
from a Western standpoint is inevitable and even scientifically 
“objective”. A fourth dogma is that the Orient is at the bottom 
something either to be feared (the Yellow peril, the Mongol 
hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by 
pacification, research and development, outright occupation 
whenever possible). 
Said aimed particularly vitriolic broadsides against the eminent 
Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, whose controversial 1990 article 
“The Roots of Muslim Rage” and later book, What Went Wrong, were 
attacked by Said for their caricatured and ill-informed characterizations 
of the Middle East60. Lewis believed that Turkey’s wrenching turn 
towards secularized, western-style democracy in the 1920s provided a 
model that could be emulated in other regional states – notably Iraq. 
In the “Roots of Muslim Rage” Lewis argued, much like the 
neoconservative arguments during the 1980s, for an impending clash 
between Islam and the West. Echoing neoconservative views of the 
Soviets, Lewis argued that the roots of the supposed “rage” ran so 
deep that accommodation with the Muslims was difficult if not 
possible. Lewis is generally credited with the coining the phrase 
“clash of civilizations” to describe this impending conflict – an idea 
built on to great effect by Samuel Huntington. Lewis’s expertise was 
sought out by various senior Bush II Administration officials after 
September 11th and prior to the Iraq invasion he is widely believed to 
have told Vice President Cheney that the Arabs above all respected 
the use of force and should not be coddled by feel-good nurturing 
policies. As reported by Jeff Goldberg: 
Scowcroft suggested that the White House was taking the wrong 
advice, and listening to a severely limited circle. He singled out 
the Princeton Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis, who was 
consulted by Vice-President Cheney and others after the terror 
                                                 
60 Lewis’s article Roots of Muslim Rage, first appeared in the September 1990 issue 
of The Atlantic; What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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attacks of September 11, 2001. Lewis, Scowcroft said, fed a 
feeling in the White House that the United States must assert 
itself. «It’s that idea that we’ve got to hit somebody hard», 
Scowcroft said. And Bernard Lewis says, «I believe that one of 
the things you’ve got to do to Arabs is hit them between the eyes 
with a big stick. They respect power»61. 
But if the epistemological foundation of the Orientalists remained 
rooted in the supposedly outdated interpretations of Ottoman History, 
another supporting element to Lewis’s prescriptive framework were 
founded on the views of the Arabs themselves. Another powerful 
intellectual foundation for the reasoning behind Lewis’ book What 
Went Wrong was that the Arabs were simply unable to compete with 
the more advanced Western societies and had to be shown how to 
“do” democracy. Here, another of the intellectual bridges to 
understanding the orientalist view of the Middle East was provided by 
Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind62 that fed into the Lewis and the 
neoconservative arguments that the Arabs had a particular and 
exceptional cultural pathology. Patai’s book offered up caricatured 
explanations of Arab behavior based on such things as child rearing 
techniques that helped produce a national character featuring an 
unwillingness to do hard work, verbal bluster without action, 
emotionalism and exaggeration and hatred of the West – to name but a 
few63. These caricatured views helped provide the supporting 
epistemological framework for the “they [the Arabs] respect force” 
message passed by Lewis to Vice President Cheney and other senior 
Bush Administration officials – a message also reflecting Likud 
thinking on this issue. 
In short, the Iraq invasion represented a “perfect storm” in which the 
neoconservative world view effectively became married to the 
                                                 
61 Jeffrey Goldberg, op. cit.  
62 Raphael Patai, The Arab Mind, New York, Sribner’s, 1973.  
63 The negative consequences of drawing upon Patai’s work for cultural education 
are highlighted by Capt. Peter Munson, USMC, in Cultural Education and the 
Reading Program, «Marine Corps Gazette», January 2006, p. 49. 
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orientalist view of the Middle East. Whatever commentators might 
assert about a supposed softening of the Bush Administration’s 
approach to the region in its second term, the legacy of the first term 
will shape the problems and policy options confronting the United 
States for the foreseeable future.  
13. Epistemic Communities and the Future of U.S. Policy  
in the Middle East 
The debate over the interpretation of events in the Middle East 
continues today and is as shrill as ever, and the stakes for U.S. strategy 
and policy have never been higher. The neoconservatives and their 
orientalist allies remain bowed by events in Iraq – but not beaten. 
Assuming that the general constructivist framework of this paper – 
that people and their ideas matter – is correct, the legacy of the 
neoconservative revolution of Bush II will continue to exert a 
powerful influence on U.S. strategy and policy in the Middle East. It 
could be argued, in fact, that the gradual descent into anarchy in Iraq 
only confirms the dark neoconservative worldview that has been 
previously outlined. The specter of a coming clash between “good” 
and “evil” remains a powerful (and politically dangerous) metaphor 
used by neoconservatives and their orientalist allies in their continued 
attempt to shape policy and strategy. 
Writing in March 2006 in the aftermath of the rioting of Muslims in 
the Middle East and Central Asia over the Danish cartoons, Martin 
Kramer poignantly voiced these arguments when he darkly warned: 
The West (and Israel) have mocked the prophet – not 
Muhammad, but Samuel Huntington, author of A Clash of 
Civilizations. Our elites have spent a decade denying the truth at 
the core of his thesis: that the Islamic world and the West are 
bound to collide. Even now, we glibly predict that possession of 
political power and nuclear weapons will make Islamists act 
predictably. It all makes perfect sense – to us. But the cartoon 
affair and the Hamas elections are timely reminders that our 
perfect sense isn’t theirs. Fortunately, it isn’t too late. There is a 
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clash of civilizations, but there isn’t yet a war of the worlds. 
«You do not have God», they say. «God is with us». That is their 
prayer. But they lack power, resources and weapons. Today they 
burn flags; a united West can still deny them the means to burn 
more. It can do so if it acts swiftly and resolutely, to keep nuclear 
fire out of Iran’s hands, and to assure that Hamas fails64. 
The neoconservative/orientalist vision of the Middle East maintains 
powerful roots in the Washington D.C. think tank community that has 
come to dominate the public foreign policy discourse over the Middle 
Eastern issues. Think tanks with benefactors boasting deep pockets 
continue to provide a steady stream of experts and supporting studies 
that will ensure that future U.S. administrations will by default draw 
upon their expertise to face the challenge of formulating and executing 
policy to meet the challenges outlined in this paper: (1) creating a 
stable political and economic climate to ensure that the Gulf producers 
can expand production to meet global demand; (2) addressing the 
region’s structural sources of insecurity that flow from demographics, 
water and resource shortages that will create an impending crisis of 
governance in the region; and (3) using U.S. power and influence to 
solve the Arab-Israeli dispute. Unfortunately, neither U.S. political 
party shows any sign of becoming more forcefully involved in solving 
the Arab-Israeli dispute and seem content to subsidize Israel’s 
construction of its 400-mile security barrier that, according to 
conservative commentator, will leave «Hamas free to cobble together 
a state from the patchwork of land left, sans East Jerusalem, which can 
be neither viable nor contiguous, as pledged by Mr. Bush. Intifada III 
is now only a matter of time – with rockets and missiles over the 
wall»65. 
Leaving aside the pressing array of tactical issues facing the United 
States in the region, this paper argues that the shape of U.S. strategy 
                                                 
64 Martin Kramer, Islam’s Coming Crusade, «Jerusalem Report», Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, March 20, 2006. 
65 Arnaud de Borchgrave, The Fifth Horseman, «Washington Times», March 17, 
2006, p. 19. 
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and policy will be determined by which combination of epistemic 
communities rise to positions of power and influence. The 
neoconservatives have moved on from the Iraq disaster and embraced 
the Huntington-Lewis-Kramer thesis of the impending clash of 
civilizations that will, among other things, drive the United States into 
an even closer partnership with Israel (if that is possible). 
It is unclear whether the realists can ever re-emerge as a force to shape 
U.S. policy in the Middle East. It is equally unclear whether the 
liberals of the Clinton era can coalesce around an alternative vision of 
the region that it can connect to a supporting policy framework. 
Important voices have been raised questioning the value of the United 
States pushing democracy in the Middle East. Republican Senator 
Chuck Hagel recently stated that «You cannot in my opinion just 
impose a democratic form of government on a country with no history 
and no culture and no tradition of democracy»66. But views like this 
from a Senator outside the conservative Republican mainstream have 
the echo of a bygone era when it was possible to have comfortable 
relations with the Gulf oil monarchies simultaneously with support for 
Israel.  
Unequivocal support for Israel has now become a de facto litmus test 
for all epistemic communities seeking to participate in the foreign 
policy process involving the Middle East, despite the fact that Israel 
has in many respects become a strategic albatross for the United 
States. The nature of the relationship makes it more difficult for the 
United States to prosecute its war against bin Laden, deal with the so-
called regional “rogue states”, prevent WMD proliferation, and craft a 
region-wide approach to balance the requirements of stability and 
democracy promotion67. Yet, the domestic political power of the 
Israeli lobby has made it anathema for any public official to declare 
                                                 
66 As quoted in Steven Weisman, Democracy Push by Bush Attracts Doubters in 
Party, «New York Times», March 17, 2006, Internet Edition. 
67 Detailed by John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, The Israeli Lobby and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, Faculty Research Working Paper Series, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, March 2006. 
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anything less than total commitment to Israel. As noted by political 
scientists John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt «This litmus test forces 
any aspiring policymaker to become an overt supporter of Israel, 
which is why public critics of Israeli policy have become an 
endangered species in the U.S. foreign policy establishment»68. The 
litmus test against public officials has also been insidiously mounted 
against the academia, with the intimidation of allegedly anti-Israeli 
scholars by Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer’s posting of dossiers of 
suspect academics on their campus watch website. 
All these factors affect the epistemic communities that can rise 
through the competitive process to assume positions of prominence in 
foreign policy execution. In essence, the overwhelming power of the 
Israeli lobby on American politics and the equally important role that 
their associated think tanks play in shaping the public debate mean 
that ideas and the power of ideas from different epistemic 
communities are negated. At a time when multi-dimensional and 
interdisciplinary analysis is required to provide creative policy 
solutions to address complicated structural sources of regional 
insecurity, epistemic communities that can be an important source of 
ideas and energy are being driven from the issue space over the issue 
of political correctness.  
Another powerful limiting domestic political force that will affect 
groups vying for influence over Middle East policy is the “security 
issue” in American politics. The so-called global war on terror in 
effect has become America’s new Cold War, with Republicans and 
conservatives holding the domestic political high ground over their 
Democratic competitors. The requirement to appear “tough on terror” 
will further shape and shrink the intellectual space for epistemic 
communities to frame strategy and policy in the Middle East and will 
by default play to conservative groups in the issue space selling the 
impending clash of cultures to the sound-byte driven media. 
                                                 
68 Ibidem, p. 18. 
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In conclusion, it remains difficult to see the prospect of a healthy 
theoretical and intellectual evolution following the neoconservative 
debacle in Iraq and the wider region. While some commentators like 
Francis Fukuyama have called for a new foreign policy that balances 
the neoconservative Wilsonian idealism with a more nuanced 
appreciation of the region, it is difficult to see how such an epistemic 
community can rise to prominence give the current constraints placed 
on the issue area by the Israeli litmus test referenced by Mearsheimer 
and Walt. The United States will continue to see its influence and 
power decline in a region moving inexorably into an uncertain and 
dangerous future if it continues to artificially limit the access of 
different epistemic communities to the foreign policy arena. 
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